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will provide protection for labor similar to that provided for capital
by the reserve policies of corporations. These reserves will prove
a reservoir of purchasing power, the use of which will tend to lessen
fluctuations in business by maintaining purchasing power in times of
stress.8 3 Lastly, the insurance will enable workers to claim a legal
right, to come forward as creditors, and no longer to be regarded
as applicants to charity.
The system gives not only de jure rights
84
but de facto benefits.
Conclusion.
In discussing unemployment insurance we are merely touching
the surface of the greatest problem confronting our generation-the
problem of social security. It is admitted by most students of the
subject that the only solution lies in a program of complete economic rehabilitation.8 5 In the last analysis, unemployment insurance
is essentially a medicinal measure applicable only after the inception
of the malignant disease.8 6 Granted that is so, what is the importance
of the legislation discussed as to "certain hazards and vicissitudes of
life?"
Historically, the enactments are of importance because they aim
to promulgate for the first time in American history a system of
compulsory unemployment insurance. They aim to bring us abreast
of the social insurance legislation that most European nations have
deemed feasible for a generation or two. Practically, both laws are
minimal, the least that can be offered to wage earners.87 But we
must remember that this is merely a beginning, an experiment. The
near future will undoubtedly see the extension and liberalization of
many features of the plan. In the meantime, both laws require intelligent administration and whole-hearted cooperation.
ISmORE STARR.

THE VANISHING SEAL.-New York in 1935 took another
long step forward in doing away with the old-time force and effect
of a seal on a written instrument. Section 342 of the Civil Practice
Act was rewritten' so as to provide: (1) That a seal upon a written
instrument executed subsequent to the effective date of the Act shall
not be received as conclusive or presumptive evidence of consideration; and (2) that a written instrument need not be under seal in
s DOUGLAS, op. cit. supra note 55, at 25-30; N. Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1935, 43:1.
' INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, op._cit. supra note 2, at 10.
' See works by Charles A. Beard, Paul H. Douglas, Stuart Chase, John

Strachey, Norman Thomas, and George Soule.
' For an elucidation of the argument that social insurance is a mere makeshift, a temporary device, a mere sop to discontent, a program which begs the
entire issue of social security, see Mitchell, Social Insurance Is Not Enoutgh
(Feb. 1935) CURRENT HISTORY.
' Andrews, supra note 76.

'N. Y. Laws of 1935, c. 708, effective Sept. 1, 1935.
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order to be effective to modify, vary or cancel another sealed
instrument.
Prior to this amendment, Section 342 had provided simply that
a seal upon an executory instrument should be only presumptive
evidence of a sufficient consideration, which might be rebutted as if
the instrument was not sealed.
At common law, a seal was a fearful and wonderful thing. In
the first place, it was no mere scroll or flourish of the pen. It was
required that it be impressed upon wax, wafer or other tenacious
substance and affixed to the document. 2 But once this was done, the
instrument became in most cases a specialty, and possessed far more
significance than a mere simple or unsealed contract.
No deed of real property was effective as a conveyance unless
it was sealed. 3 The fact that there was no consideration for the
contract or the transaction evidenced by the writing was immaterial,
for want, insufficiency or failure of consideration could not be
shown, 4 although it is true that at times equity would look behind
the seal, and refuse to enforce an instrument, as by specific performance, unless there were in fact sufficient consideration. 5 The
presence of a seal on an otherwise negotiable instrument destroyed
its negotiability 6 except in the case of a corporate seal.7 Although
the use of a corporate seal has long since ceased to be regarded as
essential to the making of a valid contract by a corporation,8 nevertheless when the corporate seal is affixed to an instrument, its due
'Town of Solon v. Williamsburgh Savings Bank, 114 N. Y. 122, 21 N. E.
168 (1889).

'2

BLAcKsToNE's COMMENTARIES

305.

' Storm v. United States, 94 U. S. 76, 24 L. ed. 42 (1876) ; see also Stiebel
v. Grossberg, 202 N. Y. 266, 95 N. E. 692 (1911). Whether this was the result
of a rule that the seal raised a conclusive presumption, or that the document
was a formal one requiring no consideration, or that a party was estopped
from alleging want of consideration, is a disputed question. See Nostrant v.
Davison, 15 Alberta L. R. 252, 51 D. L. R. 205 (1920). However, whatever
the theory, the result was the same.
'See Annotations, 2 A. L. R. 631 (1919); 21 A. L. R. 137
(1922).
A court of equity would also in some other instances give
relief from the strict common law rules relating to the seal. For instance, the
omission by mistake or inadvertence of a necessary seal from an instrument
which by its terms purported to be under seal, or on which a seal was essential
to its validity, could in many cases be corrected by reformation or otherwise.
See Note on this subject, 28 L. R. A. (N. s.) 839 (1910). So also, where the
rights of third parties (such as creditors) were involved, equity would frequently look behind the seal and inquire into the consideration (Holland v.
Grote, 193 N. Y. 262, 86 N. E. 30 [1908]). Of course in such case it was
fraud which furnished the basis of the attack on the instrument, and the want
or insufficiency of consideration was merely evidence on that point. See Seymour v. Wilson, 19 N. Y. 417 (1859).
'See Chase National Bank v. Faurot, 149 N. Y. 532, 44 N. E. 164, 35 L.

R. A. 605 (1896).
Ibid.

'Whitford v. Laidler, 94 N. Y. 145 (1883).
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execution is presumed," this presumption, of course, being rebuttable.' 0 In the law of agency, the seal was also important. Authority to execute a contract under seal had to be conferred by an
instrument under seal; 1 and if the instrument conferring authority
were under seal, it was sufficient to warrant the agent's execution
of a sealed instrument, even though it did not in terms confer any
such authority. 12 The doctrine of undisclosed principal did not apply
to an instrument under seal, which bound only the parties named
therein, proof outside the instrument being inadmissible to show
that the nominal party was acting as the agent of another.13 A contract or other writing under seal could only be modified or cancelled
by an instrument also under seal.' 4 The last important result of the
use of the seal was the extension of the Statute of Limitations to
twenty years '5 as contrasted with the six-year limitation on simple
contracts.' 6 This is not, of course, a true common law doctrine, as
the Statute of Limitations is purely statutory. 7 However, the principle has long been imbedded in our law.' 8
It is thus evident that at common law the seal itself and the
method and manner of affixing it were matters of formality, and the
results of its use were considerable and important. But many years
ago courts and legislatures began making inroads both on the
solemnity attached to the sealing of the instrument, and to the effect
of such sealing.' 9 In New York, this has been largely accomplished
by the legislature, as the Court of Appeals has on a number of occasions expressed its unwillingness to do away with the force and
effect of the seal.2 0 The legislature has, on the other hand, in
SQuackenboss v. Globe, etc., Fire Ins. Co., 177 N. Y. 71, 69 N. E. 223
(1903). The presumption, however, does not exist in the case of a promissory
note purporting to have been executed by the corporation. Weeks v. Esler, 143
N. Y. 374, 38 N. E. 377 (1894); Chase National Bank v. Faurot, 149 N. Y.
532, 44 N. E. 164, 35 L. R. A. 605 (1896).
'o Gause v. Commonwealth Trust Co., 196 N. Y. 134, 89 N. E. 476, 24 L.
R. A. (N. s.) 967 (1909).
Peterson v. City of New York, 194 N. Y. 437, 440, 87 N. E. 772 (1909).
Ibid.
'3 Crowley v. Lewis, 239 N. Y. 264, 146 N. E. 374 (1925).
"Cammack v. Slattery & Bro., Inc., 241 N. Y. 39, 148 N. E. 781 (1925);
McKenzie v. Harrison, 120 N. Y. 260, 24 N. E. 458, 8 L. R. A. 257 (1890).
" N. Y. CIVIL PRAcTicE AcT §47.
" Id. §48.
'- Wilcox v. Fitch, 20 Johns. 472 (N. Y. 1823) : see also Hamilton v. Royal
Insurance Co., 156 N. Y. 327, 50 N. E. 863, 42 L. R. A. 485 (1898).
' "At common law a right of action which had once accrued was immortal.
Experience long ago demonstrated the unwisdom of such a rule. Practical
consideration applied to the administration of justice demanded that legal
disputes should be settled while evidence was readily obtainable. Since the
twelfth century actions concerning real estate have been regulated by statutes
of limitation and since the sixteenth centurv choses in action have been similarly
restricted." Brooklyn Bank v. Barnaby, 197 N. Y. 210, 227, 90 N. E. 834, 27
L. R. A. (x. s.) 843 (1910).
" Peterson v. City of New York, 194 N. Y. 437, 441, 87 N. E. 772 (1909).
='See Cammack v. Slattery & Bro., Inc., supra note 14; Town of Solon v.
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several material aspects altered the common law rules relating to the
seal, its use and effect.
First, as to the physical form and solemnity of the sealing: In
1892, with the enactment of the Statutory Construction Law, 21 it was
provided that in addition to the wax, wafer or other adhesive substance, the word "seal" or the letters "L.S." opposite the signature
should be sufficient to constitute the private seal of a person other
than a corporation. 2 2 It was further provided that when a corporation shall not have adopted a corporate seal, an instrument or writing
executed in the corporate name by the proper officers thereof under
their private seals shall be deemed to have been executed under the
corporate seal.2 3 Remembering that when the seal appears opposite
the name of only one party, the other parties to the instrument are
regarded as having adopted that seal; 24 that a recognition of the seal
in the body of the instrument by some such phrase as "witness my
hand and seal" or "signed and sealed" is sufficient to show an intention to seal the instrument and any seal appearing thereon is deemed
to have been affixed with such intent; 2' and that even this recital is
not necessary if the word "seal" or the letters "L.S." are printed on
the instrument, as it is then obvious that they were there when the
instrument was signed and there is thus shown an intention to seal
the instrument; 26 when all these things are considered, it is clear
Williamsburgh Savings Bank, supra note 2; Crowley v. Lewis, 239 N. Y. 264,
146 N. E. 374 (1925). In the case first cited, the court said (pp. 45-46):
"While much has been said about the anachronistic absurdity of giving to seals
at the present day the solemnity and force which they once justly possessed
and while courts have undoubtedly been quite ready to escape from an alleged
invalidity of a contract predicated upon failure to use a seal, nevertheless this
court has been unwilling to make a decision generally annulling and destroying
well-settled rules pertaining to the use of seals. Such a decision without
reservations, which we would be unable to make, would result in affecting
contracts in a manner which would be chaotic and unjust. If the use of seals
as now required is to be generally discontinued this result should be accomplished by the Legislature, which could make proper reservations preserving
the integrity and force of contracts already executed and the task should not
be attempted by us."
2'N. Y. Laws of 1892, c. 677.
2 Id. §13. This provision is now embodied in N. Y. GENERAL CONSTRUCLAWS, c. 27) §44.
Id. §13, now embodied in N. Y.

TION LAW (CoNs.

GENERAL CONSTRUCTION LAW

§45.

v. Slattery & Bro., Inc., supra note 14. This rule applies as
well to corporations as to individuals, the only limitation being that the seal
adopted must be affixed as the seal of the corporation. Rusling v. Union Pipe
& Construction Co., 5 App. Div. 448, 39 N. Y. Supp. 216 (1st Dept. 1896), af'd,
Of course, evidence as to whether or
158 N. Y. 737, 53 N. E. 1131 (1899).
not there was any intention on the part of one party to adopt the seal of the
other is admissible, and such intention may be shown by any competent evidence.
Atlantic Dock Co. v. Leavitt, 54 N. Y. 35 (1873) ; Rollton Realty Co. v.
Sacknoff, 223 App. Div. 723, 226 N. Y. Supp. 737 (2d Dept. 1928). A recital
that the instrument is executed under the hands and seals of the parties is
sufficient proof that all signing it have adopted the particular seal appearing
thereon. Rusling v. Union Pipe & Construction Co., supra.
-Rusling v. Union Pipe & Construction Co., supra note 24.
'Barnard v. Gantz, 140 N. Y. 249, 39 N. E. 430 (1893).
-"Cammack
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that there is no solemnity and little 2formality
attendant upon the
7
execution of a sealed instrument today
So also, the effect of the seal has been substantially modified.
Under the present Statute of Frauds, a seal is no longer necessary
to effect a conveyance of real property.28 Since the adoption in this
state of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, 29 the presence of
a seal does not affect the negotiability of paper otherwise negotiable. 30
The new amendment to Section 342 of the Civil Practice Act,
in the second sentence, has done away with another common law
result of the seal. An instrument under seal may now be modified,
varied or cancelled by a written instrument not under seal. It will
be noted that the sentence uses the words "a written instrument" so
that an instrument under seal may not even now be modified, varied
or cancelled verbally. 31 This requirement may now be said to be a
part of the 32Statute of Frauds, and to that extent the seal still has
some effect.

It may be noted in passing that this sentence is an excellent
example of bad legislative draftsmanship. It reads: "A written
instrument, hereafter executed, which modifies, varies or cancels a
sealed instrument, executed prior to the effective date of this section,
shall not be deemed invalid or ineffectual because of the absence of a
seal thereon." (Italics the writer's.) Literally, of course, this means
' It should be noted, however, that in this state the mere expression of an
intention to seal is insufficient. There must be some compliance with §44 of
the GENERAL CONSTRUCTION LAW; either the word "seal," the initials "L.S."
or a wafer, wax or similar adhesive substance must appear on the paper.
O'Keefe v. French, 239 App. Div. 498, 268 N. Y. Supp. 102 (1933), leave to
appeal denied, 264 N. Y. 465 (1934). Thus a recital such as "whereunto we
have affixed our seals" is not sufficient in the absence of an actual seal of
some sort. Rusling v. Union Pipe & Construction Co., supra note 24.
IN. Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW §243; Leask v. Horton, 39 Misc. 144, 79 N.
Y. Supp. 148 (1902) ; Heburn v. Reynolds, 73 Misc. 73, 132 N. Y. Supp. 460
(1911) ; Fitzpatrick v. Graham, 122 Fed. 401 (C. C. A. 2d, 1903). In the case
first cited Mr. Justice Gaynor presents an illuminating history of the statute
and the necessity for a seal under its various forms. It is interesting to note.
however, that the short forms of conveyances and mortgages set forth in §258
of the New York Real Property Law recite that the parties have sealed the
same, with the exception of STATUTORY FORM M (Mortgage) which merely
recites that "this mortgage has been duly executed by the mortgagor."
'IN. Y. CONSOLIDATED LAWS, c. 30.
' N. Y. NEGOTrABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW (CoNs. LAWS, c. 43) §25.
'Even before this amendment, it was held that where one party consented
orally to the alteration of a contract under seal and the other party acted upon
such consent to his detriment, the performance of the original terms of the
contract might be said to have been waived. Imperator Realty Co. v. Tull,
228 N. Y. 447, 127 N. E. 263 (1920). At page 452 the court said: "The
original contract is not changed by such waiver, hut it stands as an answer to
the other party who seeks to recover damages for non-performance induced
by an unrecalled consent. * * * Wq think the doctrine of equitable estoppel
applies in such case."
As a general rule, a writing is not necessary to modify a simple contract
merely because it happens to be in writing. Ludwig v. Jersey City Inc. Co.,
48 N. Y. 379, 383 (1872).
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that a sealed instrument executed before September 1, 1935, may be
varied or cancelled by another instrument not under seal; whereas a
seal will be necessary if the instrument affected is executed subsequent to that date. Any such interpretation would result in an
absurdity; and the intention to produce an absurd result is never to
be imputed to the legislature. 33 While ordinarily an omission of the
legislature should not be supplied by the courts, it would seem, in
view of the obvious purpose of the statute, that the omission here is
merely an inadvertence, probably the result of an over-zealous desire
to insure the retroactive effect of the amendment, and that it is wholly
in accord with the legislative intent that the provision apply to the
modification, variation and cancellation of instruments executed not
only prior to the effective date of the statute, but also subsequent
thereto; and the courts will in all probability adopt this construction
with little hesitancy.
Coming now to the last and one of the most important of the
statutory modifications of the common law rules-i. e., the effect of
the seal as bearing on the presumption of consideration-the first
such provision in New York was enacted as a part of the Revised
Statutes of 1829

34

and provided substantially that in every action

upon a sealed instrument or where a set-off was founded upon a
sealed instrument, the seal should be only presumptive evidence of
consideration. This provision remained until the enactment of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 35 in which it was incorporated as Section
840 thereof and provided that: "A seal upon an executory instrument, hereafter executed, is only presumptive evidence of a consideration, which may be rebutted, as if the instrument was not sealed."
This section was carried into the Civil Practice Act as Section 342,
and stood without change until 1935, when the amendment under
consideration was passed. The first sentence of the new section
reads: "A seal upon a written instrument hereafter executed shall
not be received as conclusive or presumptive evidence of a sufficient
consideration."
There has been considerable discussion as to the precise meaning and effect of this provision, and somewhat doleful prophecies as
to its results, particularly in connection with general releases. 36
In the first place, it is clear, disregarding for the moment what
instruments may be affected, that there is no longer any presumption
of any kind as to consideration, arising from the use of the seal.
The legislature has been clear and unequivocal on that point. Under
the previous statutes, the seal was still, even in executory contracts,
presumptive evidence of consideration. It is true that a few cases
'People v. Lovell, 21 Misc. 570, 48 N. Y. Supp. 879 (1897); Chase v.
Lord, 16 Hun 369 (N. Y. 1878).
'2 N. Y. REV. STAT. 406, §77 (1829).
N. Y. Laws of 1876, cc. 448, 449.
' See Correspondence, N. Y. L. J., June 24, 1935; Sept. 11, 1935; Sept. 24,
1935; Oct. 1, 1935.
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decided by the lower courts 7 held that while under these statutes,
the presumption of consideration which at common law had been
inherent in the seal itself might be overcome by proof, nevertheless,
if the instrument contained a recital of consideration and also a seal,
then such expression of consideration was not subject to contradiction for the purpose or with the effect of invalidating the instrument.
Suffice it to say that this theory was never adopted by the Court of
Appeals, and indeed would seem38to have been expressly repudiated
by that Court in Baird v. Baird.
It may therefore be said that in any instrument affected by
the new Section 342, the seal is without any meaning whatsoever, so
far as its effect on the necessity for, or presumption of, consideration
is concerned, and this irrespective of whether or not there is an
expression of a sufficient consideration in the instrument itself.
Within the limitations of the parol evidence rule applying equally to
all writings, evidence on the subject may now be introduced as if
the instrument were not sealed.
As to just what instruments are affected by the amendment, a
difference of opinion has been expressed.3 0 Under the Civil Practice
Act and Code of Civil Procedure, the law applied only to executory
instruments. Now that express limitation has been omitted, and the
law by its terms covers "a written instrument." A contract, whether
executed or executory, or any other writing not a true contract but
rather a mere declaration or admission in writing (such as a receipt
or a release) ,40 is still a written instrument, and would come within
the clearly expressed intention of the legislature. In this respect, the
new section is like the old provision of the Revised Statutes of
1829,41 which applies to "a sealed instrument." This provision was
held to include both executory and executed instruments, 42 although
its scope was not nearly so broad as the present section by reason
of the fact that it applied only to an action upon the instrument or
when a set-off was claimed by virtue thereof.
'Fuller v. Artman, 69 Hun 546, 24 N. Y. Supp. 13 (Gen'l T. 5th Dept.
1893); Olin v. Arendt. 27 Misc. 270, 58 N. Y. Supp. 429 (1899).
- 145 N. Y. 659, 40 N. E. 222 (1895). "There are, it is true, expressions

to be found in some cases to the effect that while the question of consideration
is open to be varied by parol proof, yet the party cannot be permitted to claim
that a deed or other instrument with a consideration clause or a seal, or both,

is wholly without consideration, and thus entirely defeat it. If this idea is

anything more than a somewhat shadowy and fanciful remnant of the ancient
law, it is not easy to define its precise scope or practical application when
applied to an executory instrument like a mortgage. To say that in a case
like this it is open to the defendant to reduce by parol proof the sum expressed
as the consideration to one dollar or any other nominal sum, but that he cannot
go any farther, would be to confess that the distinction, if it exists, is altogether

without substance. The instrument would be defeated in either case."
665.)
."See note 36, supra.
" See Stiebel v. Grosberg, 202 N. Y. 266, 95 N. E. 692 (1911).
"2 N. Y. Rxv. STAT. 406. §77 (1829).
42 Fay v. Richards, 21 Wend. 626 (N. Y. 1839).

(At
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It would seem clear, therefore, taking into consideration the
express wording of the section, the history of the statute, and the
interpretations of its predecessors, that the legislature has clearly
expressed an intention that it shall apply to all written instruments,
whether they be true contracts (executory or executed) or merely
writings evidentiary of a transaction requiring consideration to
support it.43

As has been indicated, the statute has no effect to

change the general rules that oral evidence is inadmissible to vary or
contradict the terms of a written instrument. 44 In all probability its
greatest importance from a practical standpoint will be as it affects
instruments in which a consideration given by one party for the
promise or act of another is expressed in a recital, since such an
expression or recital of consideration is regarded merely as a receipt
and as such is always open to explanation or contradiction, a proposition of law which4 5 has long been recognized and adopted by the
courts of this state.

To sum up: We find that the rules concerning the use and
effect of the seal have undergone substantial modification from those
which prevailed at common law. The execution of a sealed instrument is no more a solemn and formal thing. Two small letters
printed at the end of a law blank are all that is required. Failure to
seal the instrument no longer renders a deed ineffectual, or commercial paper non-negotiable. A sealed instrument may now be altered
or cancelled by an ordinary writing. The seal is today no evidence
of a sufficient consideration.
On the other hand, although the seal is apparently surely if
slowly passing into oblivion, it has by no means reached that state.
The corporate seal still has the effect of raising a presumption of
due execution. It is still impossible to hold an undisclosed principal
on a sealed contract. Authority to execute such an instrument must
be conferred by one of equal solemnity. The Statute of Limitations
is still twenty years.
The reason the device should lose its physical characteristics
and be deprived of so much of its former signification is undoubtedly
due to a gradual realization on the part of the bar and the legislature
that the original necessity for and purpose of the seal no longer exist.
The reason that the use and effect thereof have not been entirely
done away with is probably that it serves as a means of accomplishing
some useful results which can be achieved in no other way under
our law. It may be desirable in some transactions (such as those
"3It goes without saying that the amendment will have no practical effect
on those instruments for which no consideration is necessary, such as deeds of
real property (Meriam v. Harsen, 2 Barb. Ch. 232 [N. Y. 1847]) and fully
executed assignments by which title is vested in the assignee (Hull v. Hull,
172 App. Div. 287, 158 N. Y. Supp. 743 [3d Dept. 19161).
"See McCurtin v. Stevens, 13 Wend. 527 (N. Y. 1835) ; Russell v.
Kinney, 1 Sandf. Ch. 34 (N. Y. 1843).
" Wells v. Wells, 8 App. Div. 422, 40 N. Y. Supp. 836 (4th Dept. 1896)
Monell v. Lawrence, 12 Johrfs. 521 (N. Y. 1815).
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involving real property) to have a limitation of actions thereon
exceeding six years. In spite of the fiction that full justice is
awarded by the courts and that the allowance of costs to the successful plaintiff is payment in full for the trouble and expense to which
he has been put in prosecuting his suit, there should be some method
of settling a liquidated claim or demand by payment of less than the
full amount due.40 Perhaps, so long as the seal retains any of its
other significations, the authority of an agent to affix it should be
equally solemn and formal.
But means to accomplish these and any other desirable ends
should be attained by some method appropriate thereto. The fact
that a long Statute of Limitations is appropriate in one transaction is
no justification for adding fourteen years thereto in another merely
because the letters "L.S." happen to be printed on the paper on
which it is recorded. That accords neither with common sense, the
intention of the parties nor the purpose of the Statute of Limitations.
The United States Supreme Court said over half a century ago that
a sealed instrument "binds the parties by force of the natural presumption that an instrument executed with so much deliberation and
solemnity is founded upon some sufficient cause." 47 Today no one
will honestly believe or seriously contend that there exists any such
''natural presumption."
It is submitted that, rather than continuing to pursue the course
followed for the last one hundred years and more, of now and then
essaying some infringement on the domain of the seal, and then a
few years later amending and changing the degree of the infringement, the better and only proper course would be to do away entirely
with this now decrepit remnant of ancient law; and in those cases
where it is still serving some useful purpose, to provide a more
logical and modern means of accomplishing the same end.
WESLEY DAVIS.

THE WAR ON CRIME.-In recent years, the problem of dealing

with crime and criminals has become a major one, and it has become
increasingly evident that the old laws and methods were ineffective
to battle the new type of criminals. Prior to the repeal of the Prohibition laws, the leaders in the movement for repeal declared that
those laws were responsible for the increase in and prevalence of
crime, and held forth the hope that with the repeal, crime would
cease. However, there was no instantaneous change-in fact, there
"6The present amendment has done away with the use of the sealed receipt
or release as a means of settling out of court many claims, without substituting
anything in place thereof. This will work a hardship on attorneys and clients
alike. Means may be devised, such as giving a worthless chattel or the promise
of a third person, as a part of the consideration. Whether or not the courts
will countenance a too bare-faced subterfuge remains to be seen.
"' Storm v. United States, 94 U. S. 76, 24 L. ed. 42 (1876).

